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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE o~F UTAH 
HOMER W. HANSON and 
BETH P. HANSON, his wife, 
Plaintiffs - Respondents, 
-vs.-





BRIEF o~F RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action to determine the validity and effect 
of a real estate mortgage entered into between Wil-
lard J. Stringer, Viola Stringer and Beehive Security 
Company. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
This case is an appeal by the Defendant, Beehive 
Security Company, of the judgment entered April 6, 
1962, in Civil No. 132132 of the District Court of Salt 
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Lake County by Judge Joseph G. Jeppson wherein the 
court decided that the mortgage entered into between 
Willard J. Stringer, Viola Stringer and Beehive Security 
Company 'vas cancelled, annulled, rescinded and held 
for naught. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiffs seek to have the judgment of the lo,ver 
court in their favor sustained. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
For purposes of convenience the parties shall be re-
ferred to as they appeared belo"T. 
On July 5, 1961, the Plaintiffs entered into an 
Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase, "~herein 
they appeared as Sellers, and Bonneville Securities Cor-
poration, a Utah Corporation, appeared as Buyer. The 
properties to be sold under this Agreement "~ere nine 
four-plexes and one home o'vned by the Plaintiffs, all of 
which property is located in Davis County, Utah. Lines 
27 and 28 of the Earnest "JioiH_~y Receipt and Offer to 
Purchase provide as follo,Ys : ''Contract of Sale or In-
strument of conveyance to be made on the approved form 
of the Salt Lake Real Estate Board in the name of BON-
NEVILLE SECURITIES CORP. (In process of being 
formed.}" (TR-75 and Exhibit 7.) 
On August 1, 1961, the parties to the transaction met 
in the office of Lothaire Rich, a La,vyer and Real Estate 
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Broker, to complete the transaction. The necesesary 
deeds for the accomplishment of this transaction were 
prepared hy l.~othairP Rich and, at the time of closing, 
there \\'Pre a total of ten deeds - five of 'vhich had the 
name of Bonneville Securities Corporation filled in a.s 
Grantee, and the other five deeds 'vere blank as to the 
Grantee ( TR-6, 7). During the course of the closing of 
the transaction, some of the documents connected ""ith 
the transartion \vere still in the process of being typed 
and there "·as considerable commotion and movement 
of people in and out of the office during the closing 
(TR-8, 9). In ans,ver to Plaintiffs' question as to why 
some of these deeds \vere left blank (as to Grantee) they 
\vere told that they \Yould be taken care of (TR 32). At 
all times during this transaction, Plaintiffs dealt with 
Bonneville Securities Corporation and intended that 
Bonneville Seenrities Corporation's name be filled in as 
the Grantee in all of the deeds connected with the transac-
tion, (TR-10) and at all times were relying on their 
.Attorney, ~~ r. Lothaire Rich, to take care of this. Both 
Mr. and Mrs. Hansen testified that they at no time kne"\\.,. 
that any other name other than Bonneville Securities 
Corporation was to be filled in on any of the blank deeds 
(TR-12, 13 and 34), and the Plaintiffs were not told that 
any other name ".,.as to be filled in ( TR-50). Thereafter, 
l\Ir. Rich did not fill in any of the names of the Grantees 
in the blank deeds (TR-48), but instead, delivered all of 
of the deeds (both those filled in and those in blank), to 
~Ir. Boyd Fullmer, President of Bonneville Securities 
Corporation (TR-48). :3fr. Fullmer testified that four of 
the five deeds 'vere filled in by Bonneville Securities 
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Corporation with the name of "Stringer"; that the typ-
ing on Exhibit 2 (the deed directly concerned with this 
action), appeared not to have been filled in by them, 
because the typing was different from the Bonneville 
Securities Corporation typewriter ( TR-60, 61). This 
deed was, however, filled in \vith the names of Willard J. 
Stringer and Viola Stringer as joint tenants and not as 
tenants in common. 
On August 2, 1961, Stringers took this deed to the 
Defendant, Beehive Security Company, and obtained a 
loan secured by a mortgage on this said property from 
the Defendant, Beehive Security Company. During all 
of this period of time, the Plaintiffs \vere in possession 
of, and collecting the rents from, the property and \Vere 
working on or about the premises for an eight -hour 
period each day ( TR-16). Prior to making the loan, the 
Defendant, Beehive Security Ciompany, took only a super-
ficial look at the property ( TR-41) and failed to make 
any inquiry of the tenants of the four-plexes, as to 
\vho owned the premises or to \vhom rent \vas paid and 
did not make any independent titlesearch of the prop-
erty, although Stringers brought \Yith them a title insur-
ance report from Black .;\ bstract Company, at the time 
the load \Vas made. This same title insurance report \vas 
used in Lothaire Rich's office (TR-40). 
On the completion of the closing, ~Ir. Hanson \vent 
to Idaho for business purposes. He thereafter returned 
to Salt Lake City and went to the office of I.Aothaire Rich 
to collect part of the payment, in the amount of $1,000.00, 
which he ""as supposed to haYc received on the tran~ar-
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tion. The money was not available and nlr. Hanson 
bceame very upset (TR-13, 14). He thereupon returned 
to Idaho to record certain doeuments which he had 
received as consideration for the ~ale of the duplexes 
and upon returning home, stopped at Farmington, Utah, 
to check the records ·w·ith regard to the nine four-plexes. 
It \Vas discovered, at that time, that four of the deeds had 
been recorded in Stringer '8 name and one of the deeds 
was missing (TR-15). The deed that was missing is the 
one directly involved in this lawsuit (TR-15). The Plain-
tiffs had discovered that the consideration for the sale of 
the four-plexes 'vas defective and immediately contacted 
l'" erden E. Bettilyon, an Attorney, who filed a lawsuit in 
the matter and a Lis Pendens was recorded on the subject 
property at 8:30 A.~I. on August 7, 1961. Thereafter, on 
August 7, 1961, at 11:05 A.1f., the deed and mortgage 
involved in this lawsuit were recorded at the request of 
Beehive Security Company. 
Subsequently, Defendants, Bonneville Securities 
Corporation, Willard J. Stringer and Viola Stringer, his 
'vife, stipulated to a rescission of the contract. 
ARGU~IENT 
PoiNT I. 
A DEED EXECUTED BY THE GRANTOR, 
WITH THE NA~IE OF THE GRANTEE LEFT 
BLANK, IS VOID AND PASSES NO TITLE 
UNLESS FILLED IN BY THE GRANTOR OR 
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This principle is clearly recognized by the Utah 
Supreme ~Court in the case of Burnham et al., v. Eschler, 
116 Utah 61, 208 P. 2d 96 (1949). There, the Court 
set down the rule as follo"\\rs : 
"Admittedly, a paper purporting to be a deed, but 
which is blank as to the grantee, is no deed and is 
ineffective as a conveyance while the blank re-
mains. See the cases collected in the annotation 
at 32 A. L. R. 737 and 17 5 A. L. R. 1294. Also, if 
the name of a grantee is inserted by a party 'vho 
never legally obtained possession of the instru-
ment nor obtained authority from the grantor 
to complete the instrument no deed comes into 
existence. Beatty v. Shelly, 42 Utah 592, 132 P. 
1160; Utah State Building and Loan v. Perkins, 
53 Utah 47 4, 173 P. 950. But if the blank is filled 
by the grantor or his agent in accordance with 
instructions given him, the deed upon delivery 
becomes operative as a conveyance.'' 
Obviously, in the case now before the Court, the 
deed was not filled i11 the grantor nor by any agent of 
the grantor, but rather, the deed passed from Lothaire 
Rich to Boyd Fullmer and from Fullmer to Stringer~ 
(still in blank) ( TR-48), ( TR-61). There never \\"'as any 
privity of contract or agreement of any kind bet"\\"'een the 
Plaintiffs and Stringers. Thus, in this case, the blank 
'vas filled in by one who 'vas neither the grantor nor an 
agent of grantor and who had received no instructions 
which authorized the filling in of the blanks. 
This rule of law was recognized early by the Utah 
Supreme Court, in the ease of Beatty -v. Shelly, 42 Utah 
592, 132 P. 1160 (1913). There, as in the rase now· be-
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fore the Court, the person filling in the grantee's name 
never legally obtained po~~ession of the deed, nor had he 
ever obtainrd authority from the grantor to insert his 
O\vn name in the deed, as grantee: 
" ... Appellant simply assumed that he had a 
a right to the deed and to insert his own name 
as grantee therein; but this assumption neither 
did, nor could creatr any legal nor equitable right 
to the land in question. We can see no ground 
\\,.hatevrr upon \\"hich the Appellant can succeed in 
this rase under the evidence in the record." 
The Utah case of Utah State Btt~Jilding and lAJan 
Association "'· Perkins, et al., 53 Utah 474, 173 P. 950 
(1918) is pertinent to this matter. There, Perkins \vas 
Treasurer of the Plaintiff SaYings and Loan Association. 
1\ shortage had developed in his accounts, and in order 
to secure such shortage, if any were found to exist, Per-
kins and his wife signed their name to two blank deeds 
and acknowledged the same before a Notary Public, 'vho 
was a Stenographer in the bank. The deeds "\vere there-
after kept in the possession of Perkins, or, at least, on 
his desk 'vith other personal papers. Later on, the deeds 
\\"ere remoYed from Perkin's desk by the same Stenog-
rapher. The legal description and th0 names of the grant-
ors and grantees \vere filled in. The deeds \\"ere then 
delivered, completely filled in, to an officer of the bank, 
\\"ho recorded them. The officer of the bank testified that 
at the time he first saw the deeds, which was the day 
they were recorded, the description and all blanks had 
been completely filled in. The Court cited the statute, 
Compiled La \VS 1907, Section 197 4, which is substantially 
7 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
identical to Section 25-5-1 of the Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, and commented as follows: 
''The provisions of that statute, in order to 
convey title to real estate, contemplate that the 
instrument shall be in writing at the time it is sub-
scribed by the party executing it, and when writ-
ten shall be declared by him, or acknowledged, 
that it is executed for the purpose as stated in th(l 
writing." 
The Court then said : 
''I find no authority holding a conveyance ef-
fective under similar facts as appear in this rec-
ord. On the contra.ry,. there appears to be no con-
flict that blank deeds or blank papers executed as 
these were are void a11d do not convey a;ny inter-
est or title whatever. Southern Pine Lumber Com-
pany v. Arnold, Tex. Civ. """\pp. 139 S.W. 917; 
Allen v. Allen, 48 Minn. 462, 51 N.W. 473; 13 Cyc. 
551 ; 8 RCL 956. '' (Emphasis ours) 
Another rase directly in point is Curlee, et al., v. 
}J orris, 196 Ark. 779, 120 S."\V. 2d 10 (1938). There, T. E. 
Cockrum and his "\\rife deliYered a deed to one. ~fr. Curlee. 
The deed was blank as to the grantee and consideration. 
Curlee wrote into the blank space for the grantee the 
name of his daughter and son-in-la\Y, Lee and Delores 
Poynter. The Poynters then proceeded to do \vhat 
Stringers did in the case prP~ent ly before the Court. 
They mortgaged the property - in this case, to a man 
by the name of Wilks. Thereafter, \V.ilks proceeded to 
foreclose his m~rtgage. The ('lourt then stated, in an~\\·rr 
to its question as to whether under these facts and con-
ditions, the deed \Vas valid, as follo\vs : 
"In Adamson Y. Hartman, 40 Ark. 58, the 
Court said: 'An instrument of \vriting, pur-
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porting to he a conveyance, signed and ack-
nowledged by the grantor, and otherwise in 
good form, does not become his deed until 
the name of the grantee and the amount of 
the consideration are inse-rted therein. And 
an agent cannot fill such blanks in the grant-
or's absence, unless his authority is in 
\vriting. 
'' 'Numerous cases are cited in support of 
the decision; and, whatever may be the rule 
elsewhere, it is settled in this state that the 
instrument in question could not become the 
deed of the grantor unless the name of the 
grantee was inserted, and that act could not 
be performed by an agent in the absence of 
the principal unless his authority was in 
'Yriting. It is not claimed that ~Clarence S. 
Courton had any written authority to insert 
the name of Clyde B. Seale as grantee.' '' 
The Court stated further: 
"Since it must be determined that this deed 
'''"as void, then Lee Poynter and his wife certainly 
took no title under it, and it is not seriously insist-
ed, though perhaps argued to some extent, that 
they were or could have been innocent purchasers 
under the said conveyance. The truth is, that 
there is no insistence that they paid anything for 
the land or that they were purchasers at all ... '' 
"It is insisted that Wilks is an innocent party 
to this proceeding. While we do not think that he 
was, it apparently makes no difference under the 
conditions above stated. He merely took a mort-
gage from one 'vho had no more title to the land 
than if he had held it under a forged deed, with-
out knowledge of the forgery. If Wilks was not 
guilty of any bad faith in the transaction the most 
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he was entitled to receive \Vas a judgment against 
those who had benefited by his beneficence. He 
certainly was not entitled to have a lien declared 
against land that did not belong to the Poynters 
who executed the mortgage . . . '' 
The Court then approved a rescission of the contract 
and restored the parties to the positions in \\Thich the 
Court found them, giving to the mortgagee a Judgment 
against the mortgagor, but refusing to allo\v a lien upon 
the property, and returned the property to the Plain-
tiff, free and clear of the mortgage. 
The Defendant has based its appeal on the doctrine 
that \vhere two innocent people suffer because of the 
wrongful act of a third person the la "T should protect 
the person who is not responsible for allo,Ying the mis-
deed to take place and cites in support of this contention, 
Tjiffany On Real Property, Third Edition, Section 969. 
It should be noted that in the excerpt rited by the .. Appel-
lant, a portion is as follo\\Ts. 
'' ... As regards an innocent grantee or pur-
chaser on the other hand, it might frequently be 
valid on the grounds of estoppel, provided at least 
he pays value.'' (Empha~is ou1·s) 
Thus, it is recognized that there i~ a necessity of 
Defendant showing that an estoppel ~hould apply in the 
case. The statement does not advocate, as the Defend-
ant \vould have us believe, that the mere delivery of a 
blank deed is sufficient to rai~e such an P~toppel. This 
position is further emphasized h~T continuing on "~ith 
the paragraph quoted hy thP Defendant, starting im-
10 
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mediately follo,ving \Vhere the Defendant leaves off, 
\vhieh RtatPs as follows: 
'' ... One thus signing a deed in blank is, how-
ever, not guilty of negligence as a. matter of law, 
a distinction being made in some of the cases in 
this respect between negotiable and non-nego-
tiable instruments.'' 
The Trial Court specifically found and made as one 
of its c~onclusions of Law, that thPre \Vere no circum-
stances, based on the evidence presented to it, "Thirh sup-
ported any contention that an estoppel should apply in 
this rase (R-30). The fact that there are uo circum-
stances amounting to an estoppel in this case is readily 
sPPn by determining what elements are necessary to 
establish estoppel. The rule is stated in 19 Am. J ur. 642, 
Estoppel, Section 42, as follows: 
''The essential elements of an equitable estop-
pel as related to the party estopped are: (1) Con-
duct \vhich amounts to a false representation or 
concealment of material facts, or, at least which 
is calculated to convey the impressio11 that the 
facts are otherwise than, and inconsistent \vith, 
those \vhich the party subsequently attempts to 
assert; (2) intention, or least expectation, that 
such conduct shall be acted upon by the other 
party; ( 3) kno\vledge, actual or constrctive, of the 
real facts. As related to the party claiming the 
Pstoppel, they arc : ( 1) Lack of knowledge and 
of the truth as to the facts in question ; ( 2) reliance 
upon the conduct of the party estopped; and (3) 
action based thereon of such a character as to 
change his position prejudicially.'' 
11 
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In this case, the fa~ts show that the deed was brought 
to the Defendant's office by Mr. Stringer, which is an 
unusual practice in itself, and that the Defendant dis-
bursed on the loan without checking the record and first 
recording the deed. This is clearly evident by the 
fact that it recorded the deed first in Salt Lake County, 
before having the deed recorded in Davis, the proper 
County. Further, it is evident that no adequate physical 
inspection was made of the premises and no inquiry was 
made to deterririne the rights of the parties in possession · 
or to whom the parties in possession were paying rent. 
If this had been done, it would have been evident to the 
Defendant that the Plaintiffs were still in possession of 
the premises ; were collecting rent and were working on 
the premises for an eight-hour period during each of 
these days and during the time that such inspection 
should have been made (TR-16). Any inquiry on the part 
of the Defendant would have brought to its attention the 
knowledge that the Plaintiffs claimed to be the o'vners 
of the property. It is uncontrovertible, from the evidence, 
that the Defendant, in fact, was not relying upon the 
property for security, this being only incidental to the 
loan., but that it was looking to the borrower for pay-
ment, ,\?hich it may still do. 
A case setting forth the proper use of such a doc-
1 riue, as is argued by the Defendant, is found in the 
recent California ease of Green Y. M acAdan1, 175 Cal. 
App. Rep. 2d 481, 346 P. 2d 474 (1959). There, the Plain-
tiff brought an action to quiet title to 320 acres of real 
estate in San Bernardino County. Briefly stated, the 
12 
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fa('ts were as follows: Defendant ~lrAdam was an attor-
ney a.t la\v \vho acted as an attorney for the Plaintiff's 
ltusband and after the death of the Plaintiff's husband, 
acted as an attorney for the Plaintiff. :\IacAdam advised 
the Plaintiff that it would be to her best interest to per-
mit him to completely manage the miscellaneous property 
left by her husband at his death. The Plaintiff signed 
~eYrral blank deeds and delivered them to l\Iar .A. dam iu 
.l\ pril of 19;)4. In June of 1954, 1\tiacAdam undertook to 
~rll the property to 1\lr. and 2\Irs. l{oskie. One of the 
blank deeds \vas filled out, purporting to convey the prop-
erty to Carol B. Bryson, J\!IacAdam 's secretary, and was 
placed of record. MacAdam then had his secretary exe-
eute a deed, purporting to convey the property to ~I r. an( 1 
~~ rs. J{oskie. l\Ir. and ~Irs. l{oskie then paid oyer 
$9,000.00 for the property and it \vas found hy the Trial 
Court that the Plaintiff had no knowledge of the transac-
tion \vith ~fr. and :3frs. l{oskie or of the recording of 
the deed to Bryson until November, 1956. The Court also 
found that the Plaintiff had left the blank deed ""'ith 1Iac-
.Lt\.dam in order to accomplish a specific sale \vhich failed. 
The Trial Court further found that the blank deed was 
not left there to be filled in for any other purpose than 
for the completing of the first proposed transaction 
'vhich, as stated above, failed to rna terialize, and that, at 
no time, did the Plaintiff authorize any transfer of title 
to Bryson or of Bryson's sale to -:\lr. and l\Irs. l{oskie. 
The Court further found that the Defendants l{oskie 
did not kno\v that the deed to Bryson \Yas a blank deed 
and that they relied solely on the representations of )[ac-
~\dam and made no independent search as to the title. 
13 
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The Trial Court found, as the Trial Court did in the 
case presently before this Court, that neither the de-
fense of estoppel nor the defense of laches had been 
established and there, as here, no attempt W'as made to 
dispute the sufficiency of the evidence to support the 
findings or conclusions and the Court held that the title 
be quieted in the Plaintiff, even though they also found 
that the Defendants Koskie \Yere innocent purchasers. 
Koskies then appealed, contending that they should be 
held to be the owners of the property as innocent pur-
chasers under the rule of common la''T embodied in the 
California Civil Code, as Section 3543: 
''Where one of two innocent persons must suffer 
by the act of a third, he, by whose negligence it 
happened, must be the sufferer.'' 
It was contended that the placing of the blank deeds 
in the possession and control of l\iacAdam was the equiv-
alent of negligence within the meaning of the section. 
The Court then stated as follow's: 
'' ... None of the cases so relied upon involves a 
blank deed signed by the owner and thereafter 
filled in hy someone else. A material distinction 
is to be found in the fact that by reason of the 
statute of frauds a.n authority to fill in and com-
plete a. conveyance transferring title to real estate 
must be in \Yriting. The rule is thus stated in 
Trout v. Taylor, 220 Cal. 652, 32 P. 2d 968, 969. 
''According to the great weight of authority, 
a deed executed in blank is void and passes 
no title. Wunderlin v. Cadogan, 50 Cal. 613, and 
cases cited, infra. As was said in Whitaker 
v. Miller, 83 Ill. 381 : 'There must be in every 
14 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
grant a grantor, a grantee and thing granted, 
nnd a deed wanting in either essential is ab-
solutely void.' In the instant case, each of the 
instruments signed by Respondent was want-
ing in all three of these essentials to a valid 
deed. Though the decisions of other juris-
dictions are not in entire harmony upon the 
question, it has been definitely decided in this 
state that under our statute of frauds the 
name of the grantor or grantee or a de-
s<'ri ption of the property cannot be inserted 
hy an agent for the grantor, in the absence of 
the latter, unless the agent's authority be in 
\Yriting. If the authority of the agent be not 
in writing, his insertion of the name of 
grantor or grantee or description of the prop-
erty does not pass the title." 
"In that connection it was eontended that be-
cause the Defendant was an innocent purchaser 
his right to the property under the chain of title 
based upon the filled in blank deed should be up-
held. The Court disposed of this argument in the 
following language: 
''Numerous authorities have established the 
rule that an instrument wholly void, such as 
an undelivered deed, a forged instrument, or 
a deed in blank, cannot be made the founda-
tion of a good title, even under the equitable 
doctrine of bona fide purchase. Promis v. 
Duke, 208 Cal. 420, 281 P. 2d 613 ; Gould v. 
Wise, 97 Cal. 532, 32 P. 576, 33 P. 323; Bar-
den v. Grace [167 Ala. 453, 52 So. 425, Ann. 
Cas. 1912A, 537], supra. Consequently, the 
fact that defendant Archer acted in good 
faith in dealing with persons who apparently 
held legal title, is not in itself sufficient basis 
for relief. ..:\n innocent purchaser taking a 
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void instrument can, however, find protection 
in the doctrine of estoppel, where circum-
stances are presented which establish negli-
gence or some other misconduct by the other 
party, which contributed to the loss.'' 
''The Trial Court in its findings specifically 
found that the plaintiff was not estopped, which 
finding necessarily implies that there was no neg-
ligence on plaintiff's part. The contention of the 
appellants, however, is that as a matter of law, the 
facts established plaintiff's negligence. The only 
facts relied upon are: first, that plaintiff signed 
the blank deed and placed it in MacAdam's pos-
session ; and second, that she permitted MacAdam 
to retain the deed and did nothing about it for a 
period of over two years.'' 
It is clear that the Defendant in this case is attempt-
ning to do exactly the same as the Appellant attempted 
in the Green case; that is, to say that as a matter of 
law, the Plaintiff was negligent and thus is estopped. 
However, in this case, as in the case just cited, the facts 
show that the Plaintiffs merely signed the blank deed 
and placed it in the possession of their attorney, Lothaire 
Rieh. The case currently before the Court is even 
stronger than the California ease for the Plaintiffs, be-
cause there the Plaintiff permitted ~IacAdam to retain 
the deed and did nothing about it for a period of two 
y·ears ; 'vhereas, here a I~is Pendens "ras filed within six 
days after the blank deed \vas delivered and prior to the 
recording of Defendant's mortgage. The Califon1ia 
Court then continued on in it~ consideration of the ease 
as follows: 
''In order to determine whether the trial court 
"Tas justified in its findings and conclusions, cer-
16 
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tain facts must be considered. In the first place, 
~11 r. Mac~-! dam was acting as Pla.intijf's attorney, 
and in his capacity as attorney at law advised and 
requested her to sign the blank forms of quit claim 
< leed. He continued as her attorney until she dis-
covered his actions and the purported sale to the 
defendants in November, 1956, at "\vhich time she 
discharged him. . . . There is no evidence that 
plaintiff was negligent in employing him." (Em-
phasis ours) 
"It is of course well established in California 
that the relationship of attorney and client is one 
of trust and confidence and that the attorney O"\ves 
to his client all the obligations of a trustee." 
'' ... In addition to that, there must be some ac-
tiYe negligenee and the only act relied upon is that 
plaintiff failed to anticipate that her attorney 
\Vould make a fraudulent use of that instrument or 
\Vould perpetrate a fraud upon her." 
''But the conclusive answer to the contentions 
of appellants lies in the fact that it was found by 
the court that an estoppel was not established, the 
fact being, as found by the court, that plaintiff had 
no kno\\rledge of the wrongful acts, to question 
"·hich it 'vas was sought that she be estopped. It 
necessarily followed, under the California deci-
sions, that there must be proof and a finding of 
negligence on her part. Whether or not a person 
is negligent in failing to anticipate fraudulent 
actions by an attorney who represents her cer-
tainly presents a question of fact for the deter-
mination of the trial court. This court may not 
substitute its eonclusion for that of the trial 
court.'' 
'' ... L\.s indicated in the Trout case, the defend-
ants are not \Yithout adequate remedy at la\Y hut 
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'must seek their recourse against the fraudulent 
defendants 'vho occasioned the loss.' '' 
Defendant, in its brief, makes a point of the fact 
that Lothaire Rich 'vas the Plaintiff's attorney and was 
acting for them on their behalf. It would appear that in 
Utah, as well as in California, it is not negligence which 
may give use to estoppel to deliver deeds in blank into 
the hands of an attorney, who is in a fiduciary rela-
tionship with you and who is expected to act in your best 
interest. Therefore, an estoppel does not apply in thiR 
case it it did not in the California case and for the same 
reason. 
PoiNT II. 
THE AUTHORITY OF AN AGENT TO EXE-
CUTE A DEED FOR HIS PRIN·CIP AL MUST 
BE IN WRITING. 
Defendant cites in its brief, the case of LeVine, et 
al., v. Whitehouse, et al., 37 Utah 260, 109 P. 2, (1910) 
as authority for the proposition that the authority of an 
agent to execute a. deed need not be in writing. However, 
the Court, in that case, states: 
''As we have observed, at the time the agree-
men in qu.estion 'lvas entered into, there was no 
statute of this state requiring the agent's author-
ity to contract for the purchaser of real estate to 
be in writing; therefore, this case did not fall 
within the exception of the general rule mentioned 
in the foregoing authorities.'' (Emphasis ours) 
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The contract referred to in this case was entered into 
some time prior to 1905 and as noted in the annotation 
found at 27 .A .. L. R., pages 606-610: 
"The Utah case of LeVine v. Whitehouse 
(Utah) supra, cited under the general rule, was 
decided prior to the Statute of 1907 ( Comp. Laws 
1907, Section 2463), which reqires that a memo-
randum must be signed by a 'lawful agent there-
unto authorized in writing.' '' 
This same wording is found in the language of Sec-
tion 25-5-1 of the Utah Code Annotated, 1953: 
''No estate or interest in real property other 
than leases for a term not exceeding one year, nor 
any trust or power over or concerning real prop-
erty or in any manner relating thereto, shall be 
c.reated, granted, assigned, surrendered, or de-
clared otherwise than by act or operation of la,v, 
or by deed or conveyance in writing subscribed 
by the party creating, granting, assigning, sur-
rendering or declaring the same, or by his lawful 
agent thereunto authorized in writing." (Empha-
sis ours) 
Certainly mention is made in the statute that an 
agent's authority must be in writing. The LeVine case 
does express the Utah law, insofar that at the time the 
case was decided, there was no statute requiring the au-
thority to be in writing, but it is also recognized in the 
case, that the transaction had occurred prior to the 
passing of the statute requiring such written authority. 
This requirement is also necessary to fill in blanks in a 
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deed. Tiffany On Real Prop-erty, Third Edition, Sec-
tion 969: 
''These decisions do not, however, meet the 
difficulty presented by the statutes in force in a 
number of states requiring a conveyance to be 
signed by the grantor or by an agent 'authorized 
in writing.' In the presence of such a statute it 
is difficult to understand how such an essential 
part of the conveyance as the designation of the 
grantee can be the act of an agent without written 
authority.'' 
There can be no question from the foregoing, but 
that the Utah Statute requires that an agent's authority 
to fill in the name of a grantee must be in writing and that 
the· Utah Supreme Court has recognized this fact. It is 
also without question that in the case presently before 
the Court, the person filling in the name of the grantee 
was not an agent of the grantor, nor was there any au-
thority to fill in the blank, either oral or written, and thus, 
the deed is a nullity and not capable of transferring title, 
by virtue of the legislative demands of the Statute of 
Frauds. 
CONCLUSION 
It is Plaintiffs' position that a deed executed ,, .. ith 
the name of the grantee left blank is a nullity unless it is 
filled in by the grantor or by his agent ''thereunto author-
ized in writing'' and that in the case now· before the 
Court, the deed 'vas not filled in by the grantor nor by his 
agent nor by anyone authorized in writing to do so, and 
that, as a result, the deed is a nullity; further, that the 
doctrine of estoppel does not apply in this case, inasmuch 
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as the Trial Court found specifically that there w·as no 
<·stoppel and there has been no showing whatever by 
the Defendant that the Plaintiffs were in any way subject 
to the doctrine of estoppel and, thirdly, that the Defend-
ant is precluded from claiming a lien on the property by 
reason of the foregoing, together 'vith the fact that at all 
times Plaintiffs remained in possession of the property; 
claimed an interest therein; collected the rents there-
from and filed a Lis Pendens prior to the recording of 
any mortgage by the Defendant. Thus, Defendant is pre-
cluded from claiming any lien by virtue of the recording 
art of the State of Utah. 
Plaintiffs respectfully submit that the mortgage on 
the subject property be held invalid and that the judg-
ment of the lower court be sustained. 
Respectfully submitted, 
KIRTON AND BETTILYON 
VERDEN E. BETTILYON and 
GEoRGE J. RoMNEY 
336 So. 3rd East 
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